Virginia Arlington County Gang Malicious Wounding Lawyers Attorney

Virginia Arlington County Gang Malicious Wounding Lawyers Attorney

by

Atchuthan Sriskandarajah

ISMAEL PAIZ v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

August 25, 2009, Decided

Facts:

Ishmael Paiz, the defendant was a member of a gang and the victims in this case, were both members of a rival gang. After a soccer game one of the defendant gang members Juan Pablo intended to fight the driver of the rival car. As Paiz was driving, he slowed down and Juan Pablo got out of the car fired several shots and then they drove off. The shots fired killed one member of the rival gang and seriously injured another. Paiz was indicted for murder by lynching (Code 18.2-40) and aggravated malicious wounding by mob (Code 18.2-42.1 and 18.2-51.2). In addition, he was indicted for using a firearm in the commission of murder and using a firearm in the commission of aggravated

malicious wounding

. After the trial commenced, the Commonwealth amended both indictments to include an allegation that the crimes occurred while Paiz was a member of a mob. The jury found Paiz guilty of both offenses. He subsequently moved the trial court to vacate the jury’s verdicts on both use of firearm convictions and to dismiss those charges. The trial court denied Paiz’s motion. Paiz appealed.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant s motion to vacate his convictions under 18.2-53.1?

Discussion:

This court held that it is only when one member of a mob commits one of the crimes enumerated in Code 18.2-39 to 18.2-42.1 that all members of the mob can be held collectively responsible solely because of their mob membership. Code 18.2-53.1, use of a firearm in the commission of murder or malicious wounding, is not a crime of violence enumerated in Code 19.2-297.1, as incorporated in Code 18.2-42.1. Therefore, the plain language of Code 18.2-42.1 requires this court to hold that Paiz, who did not use or possess the firearm, cannot be held criminally responsible for that offense simply because he was a member of the mob that committed the offense. Even though Paiz was a member of a mob, this court held that Code 18.2-42.1 does not render him criminally responsible for using a firearm in the commission of lynching and using a firearm in the commission of

malicious wounding

by mob simply because of that membership. Because of this, this court concludes that the trial court erred in denying Paiz’s motion to vacate the jury verdicts and dismiss the charges.

Conclusion:

This court hence reversed and dismissed defendant’s convictions under Va. Code Ann. 18.2-53.1.

Disclaimer:

These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm s unofficial views of the Justices opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content

Atchuthan Sriskandarajah is a Virginia lawyer and owner of the SRIS Law Group. The SRIS Law Group has offices in

Virginia

, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina & California. The firm handles criminal/traffic defense, family law, immigration & bankruptcy c

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